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Contractual Successorship:
The Impact of Burns
One of the primary goals of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA)' is to encourage unions and management to enter voluntarily
into collective bargaining agreements governing the terms and condi-
tions of work. Toward this end, the LMRA requires the parties in a
collective bargaining relationship to bargain in good faith.2 The duty
to bargain in good faith does not, however, imply a duty to agree.
Consistent with its fundamental premise that mutually acceptable
terms provide the only sound basis for a collective bargaining agree-
ment, the LMRA provides that neither union nor employer can be
forced to accept a contract, or any term of a contract to which they do
not voluntarily agree.8
An apparent exception to this principle was created by the Supreme
Court in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,4 which held that an employer
who acquired a business by merger could be compelled to honor the
arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining contract that had been
negotiated by his predecessor but that he had not agreed to assume.
The Court acknowledged that under traditional rules of contract the
successor employer might not be bound by the agreement unless he
expressly consented to assume it; nonetheless, it concluded that the
interest of the public and the employees would be better served by
arbitration, because arbitration would reduce the potential for strikes
and other forms of economic disruption likely to flow from an unantici-
pated termination of the collective bargaining agreement.5 Although
Wiley held only that the successor employer was required to honor
the arbitration provisions of the contract, the Court expressly indicated
that the arbitrator could find that other terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreement survived the merger.6 An employer who had consistently
refused to agree to any of the provisions of the old collective bargaining
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
2 LMRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1970).
3 Id. Section 8(d) of the Act is discussed in text and notes at notes 30-33 infra.
4 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
5 For a discussion of some of the tensions produced by the sale of a business covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, see generally Doppelt, Successor Companies: The
NLRB Limits The Options-And Raises Some Problems, 20 DE PAuL L. Rxv. 176 (1971).
6 376 U.S. at 555.
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agreement might thereby be compelled by the arbitrator to accept all
of them.
The Supreme Court limited Wiley's exception in NLRB v. William
J. Burns International Security Services, Inc.,7 holding that the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) could not order a successor employer to
assume the collective bargaining agreement entered into by the previous
employer. The decision was predicated on section 8(d) of the LMRA,8
which expressly prohibits compelling a reluctant party to make a con-
cession or agree to a contract proposal. The Court said: "Congress has
consistently declined to interfere with free collective bargaining and
has preferred that device, or voluntary arbitration, to the imposition of
compulsory terms as a means of avoiding or terminating labor dis-
putes."9
Burns and Wiley are not easily reconciled. Burns emphasized the
voluntary nature of collective bargaining agreements, while Wiley
found that the strong preference of national labor relations policy for
arbitration as a means of dispute settlement overcame the fact that the
successor had not signed a collective bargaining agreement with an
arbitration provision. This tension between Wiley and Burns creates
significant doubt about the continued vitality of Wiley's contractual
successorship rule. It is difficult to justify a court's decision to impose
the arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement on a non-
consenting successor employer after Burns's holding that the LMRA's
freedom of contract principles bar the Board from ordering a successor
employer to honor any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
that he has not explicitly agreed to assume. It may be, however, that
Burns should be read not so much as a general affirmation of the volun-
tary nature of collective bargaining agreements in successorship cases,
but as a statement of the limitations governing the Board's ability to
provide contractual remedies in successorship cases. On this view of
Burns, the Wiley rule that the successor can be compelled without prior
agreement to arbitrate the survival of the contract may still be applied
by the courts.
This comment first discusses the doctrine of contractual successorship
articulated in Wiley and Burns. The analysis concludes that although
Burns's "freedom of contract" rationale could readily apply to deny
the courts, as well as the Board, the power to order nonconsenting suc-
cessors to arbitrate successorship issues, this result is not required be-
cause the federal courts have a special institutional role in fashioning
7 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
8 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1970).
9 406 U.S. at 282.
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rules for the enforcement of collective bargaining contracts, which may
partially exempt them from the LMRA's prohibitions against imposing
contract obligations on nonconsenting parties. It is argued that such an
exemption can be justified only if the successorship concept is necessary
to promote the stability of collective bargaining agreements. The suc-
cessorship doctrine is then examined in terms of its impact on employers
and unions, and it is suggested that its consequences are not consistent
with the aims of national labor relations policy and that the doctrine
is not necessary for the protection of collective bargaining relationships.
Finally, the comment analyzes the role of the arbitrator in successorship
cases, and concludes that the courts should not rely on the arbitrator to
determine the extent to which a collective bargaining agreement binds
a successor employer, because such reliance would deprive the employer
of his constitutional right to have legal disputes adjudicated by a court
of law.
I. Wiley, Burns, AND THE SuccEssoRsluP DOCTRINE 10
The successorship doctrine was first applied to collective bargaining
agreements by the Supreme Court in John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston."
In Wiley, a small corporation, whose employees were covered by a union
contract, merged into a larger nonunionized corporation in the same
line of business. The union had unsuccessfully demanded prior to the
merger that "the acquiring corporation agree to assume the collective
bargaining agreement. Business operations at the acquired corporation
were unaffected by the merger, but the collective bargaining agreement
10 This comment deals exclusively with the successorship rule as applied to collective /
bargaining contracts. The successorship concept is also applicable to other areas of labor
law. The doctrine was initially developed by the Board to require successor employers to
remedy unfair labor practices committed by a previous employer. See Tom-A-Hawk Tran-
sit, Inc. v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir.
1939); Perma Vinyl Corp., 164 N.L.R.B. 968, 65 L.R.R.M. 1168, enforced sub nom., United
States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1968). The doctrine also
encompasses union representation, so that an employer may now be required to recog-
nize and bargain with a union which has gained majority status under a previous em-
ployer, provided there has not been significant change in the bargaining unit, and a
majority of the employees hired by the successor employer are members of the union.
NLR.B v. William J. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); NLR_B
v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1970). Although contractual successorship has much
in common with these other applications of the successorship concept, they do not neces-
sarily overlap, as illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Burns, holding that the
successor employer had a duty to recognize and bargain with the union, but was not re-
quired to honor the collective bargaining agreement. For a general discussion of the
variety of applications of the successorship concept in labor law, see Swerdlow, Freedom
of Contract in Labor Law: Burns, H.K. Porter, and Section 8(d), 51 TEXAS L. REv. (1972).
11 376 U.S. 543 (1963), aff'g 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.), rev'g 203 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
1973]
The University of Chicago Law Review
was no longer complied with.12 The union brought suit under section
301 of the LMRA,' 3 arguing that the acquiring corporation was re-
quired to arbitrate the issue of whether it was bound by the collective
bargaining agreement.
The Supreme Court held that the acquiring corporation must arbi-
trate the dispute, because the arbitration clause "survived" the merger.
Recognizing that the nonconsenting successor would not ordinarily be
bound to a contract of his predecessor, the Court found that the suc-
cessor employer's lack of consent was overcome by "the preference
of national labor policy for arbitration as a substitute for tests of
strength' ' .4 by economic warfare between labor and management. The
Court emphasized that the collective bargaining agreement was more
than an ordinary contract, and resembled instead a compact or con-
stitution establishing the basic legal framework of the employment
relationship.' 5 In stressing this aspect of collective bargaining agree-
ments, the Court seemed to suggest that such contracts have an existence
independent of the original parties to the agreement. The Court went
on to indicate that in appropriate circumstances the arbitrator is per-
mitted to rule that the successor employer is bound to the substantive
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Arbitrators in suc-
cessorship cases have followed this suggestion, ruling that successor
employers are liable in appropriate circumstances under the collective
bargaining contracts of their predecessors.1 6
Wiley did not require all successor employers to arbitrate the survival
of collective bargaining contracts. The Court said that, unless there is
substantial "continuity of identity in the business" before and after the
change of ownership, the successor employer might not be bound by
the arbitration clause.'7 The Court found substantial business continu-
ity in Wiley, because virtually all the union employees remained on
12 The new management notified the union members that henceforth the collective
bargaining contract with the previous employer would not be honored, although the
union employees would receive credit for their seniority and pension plan contributions
under the system of employee benefits offered by the new management.
13 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Section 301 provides for federal court jurisdiction to enforce
collective bargaining contracts, including jurisdiction to order specific performance of
arbitration clauses. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
and text and notes at notes 42-46 infra.
14 376 U.S. at 549.
15 Id. at 550. For an extensive discussion of the special qualities of collective bargaining
contracts, see generally Shulman, Reason, Contract and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HAv. L. Rav. 999 (1955).
16 See, e.g., Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 210 (1970) (Roberts, Arbitrator)
(the Wiley arbitration); Sanborn's Motor Express, 44 Lab. Arb. 346 (1965) (Wallen, Arbi-
trator).
17 376 U.S. at 551.
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the job for a time after the merger, and the operations of the acquired
enterprise were not altered by the merger.'8 Lower court interpretations
of Wiley have established a two-part test for determining whether there
is sufficient business continuity to order a successor employer to arbi-
trate. 19 First, there must be sufficient continuity in the work force;
a substantial percentage of the new employer's work force must be
made up of the union employees of the previous employer.20 The second
element is the requirement of enterprise continuity. The successor
employer must continue to operate essentially the same "business" in
the same manner as his predecessor.21 This part of the successorship
test was held satisfied where the successor employer acquired the busi-
ness by means other than a merger.22 When both elements of business
continuity are present, the courts will order the successor employer to
arbitrate the union's claim that the collective bargaining agreement
remains in force.23
A number of justifications have been advanced for requiring a suc-
cessor employer to arbitrate the question of his obligations under the
collective bargaining agreement.24 First, the expectations of employees
18 The acquiring corporation operated the acquired business in the same facilities,
using the same personnel, for about four months, at which time operations were termi-
nated, and some of the union employees were transferred to the facilities of the acquiring
corporation and intermingled with the nonunion employees of the acquiring corporation.
Interscience Encyclopedia, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 210 (1970).
19 See, e.g., United States Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 384 F.2d 38
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042 (1968); United Steelworkers of America v. Re-
liance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964); Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant
Guard Workers of America, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
20 It is not clear whether the successorship obligation can be imposed where less than
a majority of the successor's employees were union employees of the predecessor employer.
See NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281 n.6 (1972).
See also Interstate 65 Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. 248, 75 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1970), enforced in part,
453 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1971).
21 This element of the successorship test appears to have relatively little relationship
to the concerns prompting Wiley's successorship rule. However, it does seem to represent
a necessary common sense limitation on the successorship rule. Unless the successor pur-
sues virtually the same business as his predecessor, the existing contract provisions will
not be relevant to conditions in the plant. See Local 75, Drivers Union v. State Employ-
ment Relations Board, 29 Wis. 2d 272, 138 N.W.2d 180 (1965). NLRB v. William J. Burns
Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), may have changed this element of the
successorship test by adding a requirement of some type of "privity" between the suc-
cessor and predecessor employers.
22 Wackenhut Corp. v. Plant Guard Workers Union of America, 332 F.2d 954 (9th
Cir. 1964).
23 The term "successor employer" is used in this comment to indicate only the fact
that the employer has hired a number of union members previously employed in a related
business, and not that the employer has any definite legal obligation as a result of em-
ploying these individuals.
24 See Bernstein, Labor Problems on Acquisitions and Sale of Assets, 22 N.Y.U. CONF. ON
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are secured against an unanticipated change that could deprive them
of the benefits of their bargain. This argument favors employee expec-
tations over the successor employer's freedom to negotiate a new con-
tract. A second justification is that the public may benefit from a
reduction in the likelihood of strikes or other forms of industrial
disruption frequently associated with rapid and unforeseen changes in
working conditions. A final argument rests on considerations similar
to those that support preemption of state laws where federal law regu-
lates the same field. Many states have laws that require the purchaser
of a business, or the acquiring corporation in a merger, to assume the
debts and other business obligations of the acquired business.25 In some
circumstances these state laws may treat a collective bargaining agree-
ment like other business obligations. 26 But the state successorship laws
are quite diverse, and usually were not written to accomodate the
specialized concerns of national labor law. The substitution of a federal
rule of contractual successorship would produce uniform results more
in accord with national labor policy. The Court in Wiley appeared to
rely to some extent on all three of these rationales.
Wiley's holding that the successor employer could be bound to the
arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement proved to be
an expansive one. In William J. Burns International Detective Agency,
Inc.,27 the NLRB extended Wiley and directly ordered Burns to honor
all provisions of a collective bargaining contract negotiated by a pre-
vious employer. The previous employer, Wackenhut Corporation, was
an independent contractor engaged to provide security services to a large
industrial plant. Shortly before the expiration of Wackenhut's plant
protection agreement, the NLRB certified the United Plant Guard
Workers as the union for Wackenhut's employees, and the union and
Wackenhut negotiated a collective bargaining agreement. Burns under-
bid Wackenhut in the competitive bidding for the next year's security
services contract. Burns already had a collective bargaining agreement
with a union representing all of Burns's guards in the geographic area,
LABOR 81 (1970); Doppelt, supra note 5; Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations of a Suc-
cessor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 735 (1969); Note, The Successor Employer's Duty to
Arbitrate: A Reconsideration of John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 82 HAav. L. REv.
418 (1968); Note, Contract Rights and the Successor Employer: The impact of Burns
Security, 71 MicH. L. Rv. 571 (1973).
25 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 906 (McKinney 1970); ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP.
Acr § 69 (1953).
26 The argument for giving continued effect to the collective bargaining agreement
is most compelling where the employer has merely made a technical change in the cor-
porate structure, leaving the beneficial ownership of the business unaffected. Cf. South-
port Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942).
27 182 N.L.R.B. 348, 74 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1970).
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and extended an offer of employment, on those terms, to the plant
guards who had worked for Wackenhut. 28 Twenty-seven accepted em-
ployment with Bums; fifteen other Bums guards were transferred in
from other locations. The security services provided by Burns were
substantially identical to those provided by the same personnel under
Wackenhut's auspices. The union representing Wackenhut's former
employees demanded to be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent
for all guards at the plant, and further demanded that Bums adhere to
the terms and conditions of the agreement negotiated with Wackenhut.
Bums refused both demands and the union filed a complaint with the
NLRB. The Board found that Bums was a successor employer, and
ordered it to recognize the union and to honor the collective bargaining
agreement. 29
Although it required Bums to recognize and bargain with the
union,30 the Supreme Court held that Bums was not obligated to honor
the collective bargaining agreement. The Court relied heavily on
section 8(d) of the LMRA, which defines the collective duties of the
parties and provides that the duty to bargain in good faith "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession."'I The Court said that "[b]argaining freedom means both
that the parties need not make any concessions as a result of government
compulsion and that they are free from having contractual provisions
imposed on them against their will. '3 2 This emphasis on freedom of
28 Burns not only refused to recognize the union, but it actively solicited its new em-
ployees to join the rival union with which Burns regularly dealt. The Board determined
that Burns's assistance to the rival union violated LMRA §§ 8(a)(l)-(2), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(l)-(2) (1970). William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348,
74 L.R.R.M. 1098 (1970). Burns did not appeal this portion of the Board judgment.
29 The Burns case was the Board's first attempt to use the successorship doctrine to
impose contractual obligations on a successor employer. There was, however, some lang-
uage in the case law indicating that it would be proper to directly order the employer
to assume that collective bargaining agreement, instead of arbitrating the survival of the
contract. See Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.
1964).
30 The Court held that in view of the NLRB's recent certification of the union, Burns
could not have a good faith doubt as to the majority status of the union after hiring
twenty-seven of its forty-two employees from the ranks of the union. Cf. NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The Chief Justice, and Justices Brennan, Powell, and
Rehnquist dissented from this part of the Court's holding.
31 29 U.S.C. 158(d). Section 8(d) provides in part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporation
any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession....
32 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972).
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contract in collective bargaining is directly opposed to Wiley's view
that collective bargaining agreements are "not in any real sense the
simple product of a consensual relationship."83 Moreover, it is difficult
to see how Wiley's rule that a nonconsenting successor may be bound
to the arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement, and held
liable for the other provisions of the contract by the arbitrator, is
consistent with the holding in Burns. There are, however, some distinc-
tions between the two cases. Wiley involved a merger in a state whose
law required the surviving corporation to assume the business obliga-
tions of the disappearing corporation, 34 while Burns did not acquire
the business of the previous employer and was in fact a competitor of the
previous employer. But it is doubtful that this lack of "privity" between
the two employers should make any difference in view of Wiley's policy
concerns. The employee's expectation interest and the public's interest
in the peaceful settlement of labor disputes can be significantly affected
even without privity between the predecessor and successor employers.
This was recognized by the Board and the Second Circuit in Burns.85
A second distinction relied upon in Burns was that Wiley arose as a
suit in federal court under section 301 of the LMRA, 6 while Burns
was an unfair labor practice case before the Board. At first glance this
difference appears insignificant, since there is nothing in the LMRA or
the legislative history of section 8(d) that can be taken as condoning
judicial imposition of contract obligations in circumstances in which the
Board is barred from interfering with the freedom of contract. This
distinction seems to imply that the union in Burns simply chose the
wrong forum and that it should have sued in federal court on the arbi-
tration clause of the collective bargaining agreement. 7 Furthermore,
the Court gave no indication why the federal courts should have greater
latitude than the Board to require successor employers to honor collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Some possible justifications for this distinc-
tion are analyzed in the following section.
83 376 U.S. 543 at 550 (1964).
84 L. 1923, ch. 737, October 1, 1923, Laws of N.Y. (repealed effective 1963).
35 William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971), aJJ'd,
406 U.S. 272 (1972).
36 See text and notes at notes 40-43 infra for a discussion of section 301's significance
for successorship cases.
37 The collective bargaining agreement in Burns contained an arbitration clause. Ap-
pendix to Briefs at 152-54, NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406
U.S. 272 (1972). The union may have chosen to file its complaint with the Board, rather
than seek arbitration, because of the unfair labor practice complaint involved in the
case, or because it was less expensive to file a charge with the Board than to litigate a case
in federal court.
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II. SuccEssoRSHIP AFTER Burns
The Burns decision creates a substantial doubt as to whether the
federal courts, assisted by the arbitrator, may still compel successor
employers to honor collective bargaining agreements to which they
were never parties. The Court condemned not only Board-ordered
contractual successorship, but also any variety of "official compulsion
over the actual terms of the contract." 38 In fact, it was concern with
the danger of governmentally imposed collective bargaining agreements
that motivated Congress to enact section 8(d)'s explicit prohibition
against forcing collective bargaining terms on unwilling parties.39 Reso-
lution of this tension between Wiley on the one hand and Burns and
section 8(d) on the other may depend to a great extent on how the role
of the federal courts in successorship cases is perceived.
A. The Successorship Doctrine and the Federal Courts
Section 301 of the LMRA gives the federal courts jurisdiction over
suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements, 40 including jurisdic-
tion over successorship cases. The legislative history of section 301
indicates that Congress wanted to eliminate the difficulties that parties
had previously experienced in enforcing collective bargaining agree-
ments.41 Unless legal machinery adequate to enforce contract rights
was readily available, the LMRA's efforts to encourage the use of
38 NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972),
quoting H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 897 U.S. 99, 108 (1970).
39 Congress expressed concern that, "the present Board has gone very far, in the guise
of determining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself
up as the judge of what concessions an employer must make and the proposals and
counterproposals that he may or may not make . . . . [jMnless Congress writes into the
law guides for the Board to follow, the Board may attempt to carry this process still
further and seek to control more and more of the terms of collective bargaining agree-
ments." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-20 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RATIONS AcT, 1947, at 310-11 (1948). For an exten-
sive discussion of the legislative history of section 8(d), see H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99 (1970).
40 LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
41 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TiE
LABOR MANAGEmENT R.LATIONs Aar, 1947, at 423 (1948), summarized the purpose of section
801 as follows: "Statutory recognition of the collective bargaining agreement as a valid,
binding, and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher
degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote
industrial peace.
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collective bargaining agreements as the primary means of regulating
labor relations would be frustrated. Textile Workers Unions v. Lincoln
Mills42 established, however, that section 301 was more than a bare
grant of jurisdiction; it reflected the congressional desire to provide an
efficient and dependable means for enforcing collective bargaining con-
tracts, and, therefore, empowered the federal courts to create a federal
common law of collective bargaining agreements. The Court concluded
in Lincoln Mills that while federal law must be the exclusive source
of rights enforced under section 301, "state law, if compatible with the
purpose of section 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that
best effectuates the federal policy."143
The Supreme Court's decision in Wiley can be seen as a further
articulation of the new federal common law that the courts have de-
veloped since Lincoln Mills. 44 The union in Wiley had urged the Court
to rely on New York's merger law, which required the acquiring corpo-
ration in a merger to assume the business obligations of the acquired
corporation.4 But in order to fashion a remedy in Wiley, it was neces-
sary to expand the federal common law because, under Lincoln Mills,
section 301 empowered courts to enforce (and create) federal common
law, not state created rights.46 The successorship rule was, therefore,
added to the federal common law of collective bargaining agreements.
Lincoln Mills's discussion of what substantive law to apply in section
301 suits emphasized that the federal courts should look to state law as
a guide to the federal rights provided by section 301. It is reasonable
that the federal common law of collective bargaining agreements follow
state laws, such as New York's merger statute, in the provision of the
usual kinds of contract rights and remedies. Unless collective bargaining
contract rights are given protection through a body of remedial law
that increases the certainty that these rights will be enforcible, parties
will not be encouraged to enter collective bargaining contracts. Failure
to provide such remedies would frustrate the purpose of section 301.
Given the legislative purpose behind section 801, as construed in
Lincoln Mills, it may be possible to reconcile Burns's ,and Wiley's
42 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
43 Id. at 457.
44 See Ratner, Emergent Role of the District Courts in National Labor Policy, 17 LAB.
L.J. 36 (1966).
45 L. 1923, ch. 737, October 1, 1923, Laws of N.Y. (repealed effective 1963).
46 Had section 301 been construed as conferring jurisdiction to enforce state created
rights-rights not somehow imported into federal law-it would have conflicted with
Article III of the Constitution granting the federal courts jurisdiction over state-created
causes of action. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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divergent views on the propriety of imposing contractual obligations
on a successor employer. Burns's refusal to allow the Board to enforce
the collective bargaining contract against the successor is understand-
able, because only the federal courts and not the Board have authority
under section 301 to apply the federal common law of collective bargain-
ing agreements. Furthermore, Wiley may be good law despite Burns's
emphasis on freedom of contract in collective bargaining, and section
8(d)'s express proviso against imposing contractual obligations on non-
consenting parties. Wiley can be justified in terms of the purpose
behind section 301, because the successorship rule can be viewed as one
means of increasing the stability and certainty of the contractual rights
that each party has bargained for. Under this interpretation of Wiley
and Burns the successor employer's freedom of contract must give way,
in appropriate circumstances, to the need to protect the legitimate ex-
pectation of the original parties to the collective bargaining agreement
that their contract rights will prove durable.
The propriety of balancing the policies underlying section 301 and
section 8(d) to accommodate both Wiley and Burns depends primarily
on whether the successorship rule is a necessary and effective means of
protecting the expectations of parties to a collective bargaining agree-
ment, creating a greater willingness to strike bargains. Unless it is clear
that Wiley's successorship rule enhances the stability of collective bar-
gaining agreements, there is little justification for overriding freedom
of contract principles basic to the LMRA. The next section suggests
that the successorship rule may not be as necessary for protecting the
stability of collective bargaining relationships as Wiley assumed.
B. The Costs of Successorship
The majority of commentators agree that the successorship rule is on
the whole desirable.47 Little effort has been devoted, however, to assess-
ing the character of the benefits derived from the rule, or to comparing
these benefits with the rule's costs. The Wiley Court predicated its de-
cision upon two major benefits of the rule: first, union members would
have better protection of their expectations derived from the existing
collective bargaining agreement, and second, the public would benefit
because a potential source of strikes and economic conflict would be
eliminated.48 Neither of these benefits is costless, nor is it certain that
the successorship rule will produce them.
47 See, e.g., Doppelt, supra note 5; Goldberg, supra note 24; Note, The Successor-Em.
ployer's Duty to Arbitrate, supra note 24; Note, Contract Rights and the Successor Em-
ployer: The Impact of Burns Security, supra note 24. But see Swerdlow, supra note 10.
48 See text and notes at notes 24-26 supra.
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There are a number of administrative costs associated with the suc-
cessorship rule. One of the most significant of these costs is created by
the uncertainties attending the application of the rule. Wiley's business
continuity test involves a number of questions of degree that cannot
easily be answered.49 It is still not clear how much change there can be
in the operations of the business, or turnover in the personnel, before
the new employer will be held not to be a successor employer.5 0 If suc-
cessorship is found, further uncertainties are introduced by arbitration
of successorship disputes. The arbitrator is not required to follow prece-
dent, and his awards are not subject to extensive review.5 ' Furthermore,
because the successorship obligation may be avoided if the employer
hires only a few former members of the union,52 or a transaction is re-
structured to cut down on the continuity of operations, the rule is sub-
ject to manipulation. These uncertainties make it difficult to conclude
a business transaction, because the parties cannot know what their sub-
sequent costs will be. The likelihood of litigation is also increased, and
with it the costs that the parties and the public pay to enforce the suc-
cessorship rule.5 3
The successorship rule can impose direct costs on the union members,
because the successorship' rule may bind unions as well as employers.5 4
When the union has made a concession because the predecessor em-
ployer's business was failing, the successor employer may attempt to
enforce the collective bargaining agreement against the union.5 5 From
the viewpoint of the predecessor employer this collective bargaining
agreement becomes a premium contract from which he can profit if he
can sell the business in such a way that the rule of contractual successor-
ship will apply. The cost to the union's membership in this case is the
difference between the contract wage rate and the higher wages that
49 See text and notes at notes 17-23 supra.
50 See note 20 supra.
51 See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers Union, Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.
1966).
52 Cf. Retail Store Employees Union v. Lane's of Findlay, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 655 (1960).
53 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW (to be published in 1973) (manuscript on
file at The University of Chicago Law Review).
54 Cf. Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftsmen's Ass'n, 393 F.2d 407 (1968). In
Bath the union argued that its contract was terminated by merger of the subsidiary cor-
poration covered by the contract into the parent corporation. There was also another col-
lective bargaining agreement in force between the union and the parent corporation. The
Court held that arbitration was an appropriate means of determining which provisions of
what contract should be enforced after the merger.
55 The Burns Court recognized that this was one possible application of the successor-
ship rule working to the detriment of the union. NLRB v. William J. Burns Int'l Security
Services, Inc., 40(1 U.S. 272, 288 (1972).
[40:617
Contractual Successorship
could be obtained from the more prosperous successor employer. The
aggregate losses of unionized employees from this aspect of the succes-
sorship rule could, over the long run, offset gains in other successorship
cases.
When the requirements of the successorship test are met and the
contract is generally favorable to the union, the employer will bear the
direct costs of the successorship obligation. As the Court recognized in
Burns, a contract favorable to the union will reduce the price the pre-
decessor employer can obtain when he sells the business, because it in-
creases the buyer's cost of operating the business.5 6 However, the costs
of successorship will encourage the successor employer to avoid hiring
union members covered by the collective bargaining agreement in suffi-
cient numbers to trigger successorship. Moreover, after Burns, the suc-
cessor employer might also avoid the successorship rule by structuring
the transaction to eliminate "privity" between himself and the prede-
cessor employer. 57 Only employers and not unions possess these oppor-
tunities to avoid the successorship obligation, making it possible for
them to enforce collective bargaining agreements unfavorable to the
union, while escaping contracts beneficial to the union. In sum, the suc-
cessorship rule could prove more burdensome to unions than to em-
ployers.
Although it is impossible to know whether these costs of the succes-
sorship rule outweigh the supposed benefits, the successorship doctrine
can also be criticized without resorting to a final weighing of costs and
benefits. Virtually the same benefits can be obtained, at less cost, if
the parties are left to negotiate for successorship clauses in collective
bargaining agreements. 58 Contractually provided successorship would
suffer from fewer of the ambiguities and uncertainties connected with
judicially imposed successorship, and thus involve fewer administrative
56 Id. at 287-88.
57 For example, an auction purchaser of the physical assets of a business should not be
required to assume any of the business's contractual obligations. But cf. Uniform Com-
mercial Code §§ 6-101 to -06. See also NLRB v. Wayne Convalescent Center, 465 F.2d 1039
(6th Cir. 1972).
58 In National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 325 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 457 F.2d 1127 (2d Cir. 1972), the court enjoined the em-
ployer from selling one of his ships without obtaining an agreement from the buyer to
honor the collective bargaining agreement, as required by the successorship clause of the
agreement. The court (Frankel, J.) concluded that the clause was not a violation of the
antitrust laws or section 8(e) of the LMRA. In a later proceeding, however, the Board
ruled that the clause violated the "hot cargo" provisions of section 8(e) of the LMRA.
Commerce Tanker Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 166, 80 L.R.R.M. 1198 (1972). However, the
Board's ruling was confined to the specific context involving the purchase and sale of
ships.
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costs.59 Additionally, if the parties agreed upon a successorship clause,
they would have the opportunity to apportion the direct costs of suc-
cessorship between themselves, according to their own priorities and
relative bargaining strengths. It would, of course, be difficult to enforce
the successorship clause in all cases. For example, the business that is
purchased might be integrated into a larger enterprise where another
union already represents the employees and there is another collec-
tive bargaining agreement in force.60 These problems arise, however,
whether successorship is controlled by judicially developed rules or by
agreement between the parties. A final advantage to negotiated succes-
sorship is that it allows the parties to exercise their own judgment in
accordance with the principle of freedom of contract in collective bar-
gaining.
Failure to include a successorship clause in the collective bargaining
agreement should be interpreted as an indication that the union would
rather deal with the successorship issue when it arises,61 or that the
union lacked the bargaining strength to obtain such a clause. It should
not be necessary to rely on judicially imposed successorship in the ab-
sence of a successorship clause, because if the union is not strong enough
to obtain a successorship clause, it is less likely to engage in a prolonged
strike or other test of economic strength that could have adverse conse-
quences for the public.6 2 Furthermore, it is questionable whether the
successorship rule is, in fact, needed to protect the legitimate expec-
tancies of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement. There is
no indication the successorship situation is so unusual that the parties
should not be expected to bargain over this subject as they would other
matters affecting their rights under the contract. 3 The rule, therefore,
59 The contract can be drafted to make it clear that the buyer-employer will be re-
quired to assume the collective bargaining agreement. Although there may be litigation
over the proper interpretation of the successorship clause in cases where only part of the
assets of the business are sold, there would be no need for the additional costs and delays
of arbitration.
60 See McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1966); cf. Bath Iron
Works Corp. v. Bath Marine Draftsmen's Ass'n, 393 F.2d 407 (1968).
61 The union may even want a clause prohibiting assignment of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, especially where a concession is granted to help a failing employer.
62 Moreover, application of the successorship rule where neither party is strong enough
to obtain a successorship clause is exactly the kind of governmental interference with the
substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement which Congress sought to prohibit
in section 8(d). See note 39 supra.
63 In Wiley the union had bargained unsuccessfully for a successorship clause in the
contract, although this bargaining had occurred in negotiations prior to those leading to
the contract involved in the case, Inter-science Encyclopedia, 55 Lab. Arb. 210, 211 (1970)
(Roberts, Arbitrator). The Supreme Court, however, was apparently unaware of this fact,
376 US. at 544.
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seems to provide a windfall for either the union or the employer de-
pending on whether the contract rate of compensation is above or below
the rate that could be obtained in a new round of bargaining. In the
long run, stable bargaining relationships are created when the obliga-
tions of each party reflect their relative economic power, and not by
judicially imposing obligations that have no relationship to the relative
positions of the parties. It is doubtful, therefore, that the successorship
rule can ever accomplish its aim of reducing the potential for industrial
strife. For these reasons, contractually negotiated successorship appears
to be in closer harmony with the goals of national labor relations policy.
III. Ti ROLE OF THE AR-BITRATOR IN SUCCESSORSHIP CASES
The arbitrator plays a central but little noted role in enforcing the
successorship rule. The duty to bypass the courts and submit disputes
instead to an arbitrator can ordinarily be created only by contract. 4 In
Wiley, however, the successor employer had not consented to any arbi-
tration provisions, but was nonetheless required to arbitrate. Although
Wiley's conclusion that the "duty to arbitrate survives" the acquisi-
tion6" seems to be merely a convenient way of saying that, as a matter
of law, the successor employer impliedly consented to be bound by the
arbitration clause when he acquired the business, it also tends to ob-
scure one of the fundamental differences between traditional labor
arbitration and successorship arbitration. In the standard labor arbitra-
tion case, the authority of the arbitrator is prescribed by the scope of
the arbitration clause. His duty is to interpret the provisions of the
contract in accordance with the expressed intentions of the parties, in
light of their bargaining history and the arbitrator's experience in the
particular industry.66
In contrast, the successorship arbitrator must decide which provisions
of the agreement will bind the nonconsenting party; he does not con-
strue existing terms, but decides whether there are terms, and if so,
what they are. 7 The successorship arbitrator's authority cannot, there-
64 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 863 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
65 876 U.S. at 50-51.
06 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
67 There is some division of authority over whether the successorship arbitrator can
enforce only part of the collective bargaining agreement against the successor employer.
However, it is now generally accepted that the arbitrator may vary his award from the
terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement, where he finds that it would be
inequitable or impractical to order either party to comply fully with the existing contract.
See United Steelworkers of America v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3rd Cir.
1964); Goldberg, supra note 24, at 775-85.
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fore, be thought of as stemming from the arbitration clause, which the
court finds has "survived." Rather, his authority is based on the court's
power to delegate to an arbitrator the judicial power to determine the
contractual duties of the parties. While a court itself perhaps has the
power to fix obligations in this fashion, serious constitutional objections
can be raised to the delegation of this authority to an arbitrator. Judi-
cial reliance on the arbitrator to resolve successorship deprives the
parties of their due process rights to a judicial resolution of their dis-
pute.
Only rarely have the courts been required to define the due process
right to obtain a judicial determination of one's legal obligations. In
Boddie v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court held that a denial of due
process resulted when the state charged fees that made divorce pro-
ceedings effectively unavailable to lower income applicants. The Court
reasoned that where the state provided the only effective means for
dissolving the marriage relationship, the state had the duty to provide
the opportunity for access to the judicial system to all. Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority, concluded that due process requires open ac-
cess to the judicial system wherever the government has a monopoly
over the only binding means of settling private disputes. 69 Most due
process requirements come into play only after one party has initially
invoked the government's judicial power. At this point, the judicial
system becomes the only effective means for resolving the conffict, and
due process guarantees are necessary to protect both parties against an
arbitrary or capricious exercise of that monopoly power. Among the
due process guarantees are the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard,7 0 the right to a jury trial,71 the right to counsel,72 the right not
to be arbitrarily denied an appeal,73 the right to subpoena witnesses, 74
and other guarantees "fundamental" to a scheme of ordered liberty.75
Together, these rights define the character of the judicial process that
the government must provide when its monopoly on coercive force is
used to deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property.
Compulsory arbitration of successorship cases deprives the parties of
important due process rights. Neither party can obtain a jury deter-
68 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
69 401 U.S. at 375-76.
70 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 895 U.S.
387 (1969).
71 U.S. CONsr. amend VI, VII.
72 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 835 (1963).
73 Griffin v. Illinois, 851 U.S. 12 (1956).
74 Cf. Escalera v. Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1970).
75 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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mination of issues of fact, because the arbitrator becomes the trier of
fact. They lose the right to subpoena witnesses and obtain testimony
under penalty of perjury. 6 The arbitrator may not have legal expertise,
and he is not sworn to uphold the law, or required to decide cases in
accordance with law. 7 His decisions are not appealable, and there is
only very limited review of an arbitration award prior to its enforce-
ment by a court.78 All of these rights are important to the due process
protection given litigants in judicial proceedings, but not in arbitra-
tion.
In spite of these deficiencies, however, a number of considerations
have been suggested as justifying arbitration of successorship issues.79
First, the Board and the courts are to a considerable degree bound by
precedent, and, therefore, unable to take into account ad hoc consid-
erations that may be more likely to lead to a peaceful solution of the
dispute. For example, it would be difficult for the courts to find a legal
justification for enforcing only part of the collective bargaining agree-
ment against the successor employer, whereas the arbitrator is prepared
to deal with equities and render compromise awards in the interest of
reducing industrial strife. The problem with these arguments is that
they merely confirm the extent of the party's loss when his opportunity
to litigate in court is removed. Arbitration is more flexible precisely
because it does not provide the protection of a judicial proceeding.
In contrast, the ordinary arbitration proceeding does not deny the
parties due process of law. The Supreme Court in Boddie v. Connect-
iCutO recognized that the due process right to obtain a judicial resolu-
tion of one's disputes can be waived. This is also the implication of the
first Supreme Court cases, the Steelworkers Trilogy, construing labor
arbitration clauses.8 ' In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co. 2 the Court held that the parties could only be
76 The arbitrator does not have the court's contempt power to compel the appearance
of witnesses. B. MEirzER, LABOR LAw CASEs, MATERuALS AND PRoBLEMs 746 (1970).
77 It may even be the arbitrator's duty to ignore the law when it would require him to
violate the terms of the contract. See Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and
Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 89 U. Cm. L. REv. 80, 38 (1971).
78 See cases cited note 51 supra.
79 Goldberg, supra note 24, at 781-83; Note, Contract Rights and the Successor Em-
ployer: The Impact of Burns Security, supra note 24, at 582-86; The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 247, 256-57 (1972).
80 401 U.S. 871, 878-79 (1971). See also D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
81 The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel S, Car Corp., 863 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 368 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Co., 368 U.S. 564 (1960).
82 868 U.S. 574 (1960).
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ordered to submit to arbitration those disputes that were covered by the
arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement. The implicit
holding of this case, and its two companion cases, is that there is an
initial right to have disputes settled by judicial proceedings unless that
right has been contracted away by agreeing to arbitrate.
In the successorship cases the parties are compelled to arbitrate on
the theory that the arbitration clause "survives," binding the successor
employer-an implied agreement to arbitrate arising from the circum-
stances of the successor's acquisition of the business. Since any agreement
to arbitrate, express or implied, amounts to a waiver of the parties' due
process rights obtainable in a judicial proceeding, such a waiver should
be governed by the standards applicable to other waivers of constitu-
tional rights. It is well established that the courts will not readily imply
a waiver of a constitutional right.83 In D. H. Overmeyer Co., Inc. of
Ohio v. Frick Co.84 the Court applied this settled principle to confession
of judgment clauses, holding that a litigant could "voluntarily, intel-
ligently and knowingly [waive] the rights it otherwise possessed,"8 5
to answer and defend in a judicial proceeding. In the successorship
cases, there is no adequate waiver, no intentional relinquishment of a
known constitutional right.8 6
The central difficulty with relying on the arbitrator to resolve suc-
cessorship disputes is that the arbitrator is called on to perform a role
that is normally the function of the courts.87 Even if it is assumed that
a successor employer has impliedly consented to arbitration, successor-
ship disputes over the parties' contract rights cannot be resolved by
arbitration as it is ordinarily understood, because the dispute is not
over how the contract should be interpreted, but involves the prior
question of whether there is a contract between the parties.88 When
83 See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.s. 1 (1966); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n,
301 U.S. 292 (1937). In Brookhart the Court said: "There is a presumption against the
waiver of constitutional rights, see, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70-71; and
for a waiver to be effective it must be dearly established that there was an intentional re-
linquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, Johnson v. Zerbst, 804 U.S.
458, 464," 384 U.S. at 4.
84 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See also Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
85 405 U.S. at 187.
86 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
87 In his landmark article on the subject, Dean Shulman said: "A proper conception of
the arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by
superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept. He has no general charter to
administer justice for a community which transcends the parties. He is rather a system of
self-government created by and confined to the parties." Shulman, supra note 15, at 1016.
88 The scope of the arbitration clause is not broad enough to permit the arbitrator to
impose contractual terms on the successor because it does not give him authority to write
new terms for new parties.
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the arbitrator undertakes to resolve this question he is essentially acting
as a special master for the court, and his activities should be governed by
rules similar to those governing the use of masters in federal courts,8 9
including a recognition of the long-standing principle that reference
of a case for a final decision on questions of both law and fact ordi-
narily requires the consent of the parties.90 At a minimum, the courts
should recognize that the arbitrator is exercising a judicial and not a
contractual authority, and apply an expansive standard for reviewing
the decisions of the successorship arbitrator. 91
CONCLUSION
Wiley's successorship rule is difficult to reconcile with the prin-
ciple that collective bargaining agreements must be voluntarily nego-
tiated contracts, reflecting the bargaining strengths of the parties to
the agreement, if they are to provide a sound structure for governing
labor management relations. This comment has suggested that it is
possible to find a construction of the LMRA that subsumes both the
successorship rule and the principle of freedom of contract in collective
bargaining. It, however, appears doubtful that on balance the benefits
derived from the successorship rule justify an exception to the principle
of freedom of contract fundamental to the LMRA. Moreover, it is diffi-
cult to find an appropriate forum for enforcing the successorship rule,
because arbitration of successorship disputes forces parties to forego
important constitutional rights. Although the successorship obligation
might be imposed directly by the courts, as a means of avoiding con-
stitutional difficulties with successorship arbitration, it is argued that
a return to negotiated successorship provisions in collective bargaining
agreements is more desirable.
Lock Holmes
89 FFD. R. Civ. P. 53; 28 U.S.C. §§ 631 et seq. specifies the conditions and procedures for
referring cases to masters.
90 See Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512 (1888); Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Fed-
eral Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. CH. L. REv. 584 (1973); cf. La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co., 852 U.S. 249 (1957).
91 In United Steelworkers of America v. United States Gypsum Co., 339 F. Supp. 302
(N.D. Ala. 1972) the court undertook a detailed review of a successorship arbitration award,
vacating several provisions of the award. The case suggests that a different standard for
reviewing successorship arbitration awards is developing.
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